Revitalizing the Corn Products Doctrine by Mermall, Michael E.
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 64 Issue 1 
January 1986 
Revitalizing the Corn Products Doctrine 
Michael E. Mermall 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Michael E. Mermall, Revitalizing the Corn Products Doctrine, 64 WASH. U. L. Q. 217 (1986). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol64/iss1/8 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
REVITALIZING THE CORN PRODUCTS DOCTRINE
The Supreme Court, in Corn Products Refining Co. v. Commissioner,1
created a nonstatutory exception to the definition of capital assets.2 This
exception, known as the Corn Products doctrine, provides ordinary treat-
ment for property that produces a normal source of business income,
even though the property would otherwise fall under the definition of a
capital asset provided in section 1221 of the Internal Revenue Code (the
Code).3 The Tax Court, however, has repeatedly narrowed the doctrine,
restricting its application in several ways.4
This Note examines the development and erosion of the Corn Products
doctrine and suggests a framework for its revitalization. Part I discusses
the birth and significance of the doctrine. Part II traces the doctrine's
application by the Tax Court and other federal courts and reviews the
restrictions placed on the doctrine's scope. In Part III, this Note ana-
lyzes an unsuccessful attempt by Congress to reform the Corn Products
doctrine. Finally, Part IV proposes a business risk test that would enable
courts to define the scope of the Corn Products doctrine in accordance
with congressional intent.
I. THE CORN PRODUCTS DOCTRINE
Section 1221 of the Code defines capital assets as "property held by the
taxpayer," with five classes of exceptions.' The distinction between capi-
tal assets and ordinary assets is important because it triggers different tax
1. 350 U.S. 46 (1955).
2. Section 1221 of the Internal Revenue Code [hereinafter cited as the Code] defines capital
assets as follows:
For purposes of this subtitle, the term "capital asset" means property held by the tax-
payer (whether or not connected with his trade or business), but does not include-
(1) stock in trade of the taxpayer or other . . . property held by the taxpayer primarily
for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business;
(2) property, used in his trade or business, of a character which is subject to the allow-
ance for depreciation provided in section 167, or real property used in his trade or business;
(3) a copyright, a literary, musical, or artistic composition, a letter or memorandum, or
similar property...;
(4) accounts or notes receivable acquired in the ordinary course of trade or business for
services rendered or from the sale of property described in paragraph (1);
(5) a publication of the United States Government. ...
IR.C. § 1221 (1982).
3. See infra notes 5-23 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 52-70 and accompanying text.
5. See supra note 2.
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treatment for gains and losses recognized from the sale or disposition of
an asset. 6 From the taxpayer's perspective, ordinary gains are less desir-
able than capital gains and ordinary losses are more desirable than capi-
tal losses.7
The Supreme Court, in Corn Products Refining Co. v. Commissioner,'
created a nonstatutory sixth exception to the definition of a capital asset.9
In Corn Products, the company manufactured products from grain
corn.10 Due to limited storage facilities, it maintained only a three-week
supply of corn.11 When the company exhausted this reserve, it bought
corn on the spot market. 2 In order to insulate itself against unexpected
price surges in the spot market, the company bought corn futures.3 If
the futures price was less than the spot market price, the company took
delivery of the corn. Otherwise, the company paid the price on the spot
market and sold the futures.1" The company treated the sale of its corn
futures as the sale of capital assets.15
Both the Tax Court16 and the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit1 7 held that the corn futures were ordinary assets, thus requiring the
company to pay a higher tax on the recognized gains from the sales.18
The Supreme Court affirmed, "9 noting that the futures played an "inte-
6. The Code applies different tax treatment to capital assets and ordinary assets. A
noncorporate taxpayer may deduct 60% of any net capital gain. I.R.C. § 1202 (1982). On the other
hand, ordinary gains do not qualify for this deduction. As for losses, the Code allows a deduction
for the full amount of ordinary losses, but limits deductions for capital losses. I.R.C. § 1211 (1982).
7. See supra note 6. See generally 1 TREASURY DEPARTMENT REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT,
TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 100-105 (1984) (discussing
the "complexity" and "inequitable" operation of capital gains treatment).
8. 350 U.S. 46 (1955).
9. Id. at 47.
10. Id. at 48.
11. Id
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 48-49.
15. Id. at 49. See supra note 6 (discussing the different tax treatment accorded capital gains
and ordinary income).
16. 11 T.C.M. (CCH) 721 (1952).
17. 215 F.2d 513 (2d Cir. 1954).
18. The Tax Court found that the futures contracts were a hedge against price increases and
thereby qualified for ordinary asset treatment. 11 T.C.M. (CCH) at 726. The court of appeals also
applied ordinary asset treatment, finding that the futures could not "reasonably be separated from
the inventory item" excluded from the definition of capital assets under the Code. 215 F.2d at 516.
The court of appeals reasoned that because the company entered the futures market to stabilize
inventory costs, the futures contracts should be treated as inventory. Id.
19. 350 U.S. at 54.
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gral part" in the taxpayer's business.2 0 The Court noted that capital as-
set treatment is an exception to the Code's normal treatment of
property.2 1 Furthermore, capital assets should be defined narrowly and
its exceptions should be applied broadly.22 The Court ultimately held
that Congress intended to treat profits and losses from everyday business
operations as ordinary income or loss. 2 3
II. APPLICATION OF THE CORN PRODUCTS DOCTRINE
Implicit in the Corn Products opinion is the Supreme Court's examina-
tion of the taxpayer's motives for purchasing the asset in question. 4 In
subsequent cases, courts have used a variety of motive tests to distinguish
capital assets from ordinary assets. The most widely applied tests are the
business motive/investment motive test and the substantial investment
motive test.
A. The Business Motive/Investment Motive Test
In Booth Newspapers, Inc. v. United States,25 the Court of Claims ap-
plied the business motive/investment motive test for the first time. In
Booth, the taxpayers were newspaper publishers who had purchased a
paper mill to ensure a steady supply of newsprint. Upon the sale of the
mill, the taxpayers treated the loss from the sale as an ordinary loss.
2 6
The Court of Claims agreed with the taxpayers, treating the motive issue
as an either-or inquiry. Under the test, an asset is either acquired and
held with an investment motive, receiving capital asset treatment, or is
acquired and held with a business motive, requiring ordinary treat-
ment.2 7 No search is made for a possible secondary motive or purpose.28
20. The Court noted that both lower courts had found the company's purchases of futures to be
an integral part of the taxpayer's business. The Court further noted that these findings were ques-
tions of fact and thus "should not ordinarily be disturbed." Id at 51.
21. Id. at 52. The Code reflects congressional intent to preclude preferential tax treatment to
gains and losses arising from everyday business operations. See, eg., I.R.C. § 337 (1982) (recogniz-
ing gain or loss upon the liquidation of certain business property); I.R.C. § 1221 (1982) (denying
capital asset treatment to certain business property); I.R.C. § 1231 (1982) (providing ordinary treat-
ment to net losses from disposition of certain business property).
22. 350 U.S. at 52.
23. Id. at 52-53.
24. Id. at 50-51.
25. 303 F.2d 916 (Ct. Cl. 1962).
26. Id. at 917-20.
27. In Booth, the Court of Claims stated:
[I]f securities are purchased by a taxpayer as an integral and necessary act in the conduct
Number 1]
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In Missisquoi Corp. v. Commissioner,29 the Tax Court endorsed the
business motive/investment motive test. Although the Tax Court ac-
knowledged the existence of an investment purpose behind the purchase
of certain securities, it held that such purpose did not motivate the trans-
action.30 The court thus disregarded any underlying investment motive,
focusing only on the predominant business motive.31 The Internal Reve-
nue Service formally adopted the business motive/investment motive test
in Revenue Ruling 75-13.32
Use of the business motive/investment motive test enabled courts to
broadly apply the Corn Products doctrine to a wide variety of assets
33
and businesses.34 In United States v. Generes,35 the Supreme Court ex-
panded the business motive/investment motive test to cover losses for
bad debts. According to the Court, a "dominant-motivation standard"
should determine whether a taxpayer entered a transaction with a busi-
ness or investment motive.36  According to the Court, this approach
of his business, and continue to be so held until the time of their sale, any loss incurred as a
result thereof may be fully deducted from gross income as a[n]. . . ordinary loss. If, on
the other hand, an investment purpose [is] found to have motivated the purchase or hold-
ing of the securities, any loss realized upon their ultimate disposition must be treated in
accord with the capital asset provisions of the Code.
303 F.2d at 921. This language is consistent with the approach employed in Corn Products, which
focused on the presence of business motives to negate any investment motive. See Corn Products,
350 U.S. at 50.
28. For several recent cases applying the business motive/investment motive test, see, e.g.,
Campbell Taggart, Inc. v. United States, 744 F.2d 442, 459 (5th Cir. 1984) (taxpayer motivated
solely by business motive); Irwin v. United States, 558 F.2d 249, 252 (5th Cir. 1977) (taxpayer
motivated solely by business motive); Luszko v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 1048, 1050 (1981)
(taxpayer motivated by dominant investment motive); Datamation Servs., Inc. v. Commissioner, 35
T.C.M. (CCH) 1092 (1976) (taxpayer motivated by predominant investment motive).
29. 37 T.C. 791 (1962).
30. Id. at 796.
31. See Note, Taxpayer Motivation and the Corn Products Doctrine, 29 Tax Law. 660, 665
(1976).
32. Rev. Rul. 75-13, 1975-1 C.B. 67 (revoked by Rev. Rul. 78-94, 1978-1 C.B. 58).
33. See, eg., Hollywood Baseball Ass'n v. Commissioner, 423 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1970) (con-
tracts); Commissioner v. Bagley & Sewell Co., 221 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1955), aff'g 20 T.C. 983 (1953)
(government bonds); Arkansas Best Corp. v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 640 (1984) (shares of stock).
34. Courts have applied the Corn Products doctrine to corporate taxpayers whose only activities
consisted of acquiring and managing their securities. See, eg., Campbell Taggart, Inc. v. United
States, 744 F.2d 442 (5th Cir. 1984); Allied Chem. Corp. v. United States, 305 F.2d 433 (Ct. Cl.
1962); Arkansas Best Corp. v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 640 (1984). However, in the case of a
noncorporate taxpayer, the Supreme Court held that managing securities was not a business. Hig-
gins v. Commissioner, 312 U.S. 212, 218 (1941).
35. 405 U.S. 93 (1972).
36. In Generes, the Court considered whether an uncollectable loan constituted a "business" or
a "nonbusiness" bad debt. The taxpayer owned 44% of the stock of a close corporation, having
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol64/iss1/8
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would afford "workability" and "certainty." 7
B. The Substantial Investment Motive Test
Unlike the business motive/investment motive test, the substantial in-
vestment motive test recognizes that a transaction may involve dual mo-
tives. Under this test, the existence of a substantial investment motive
precludes application of the Corn Products doctrine.
Beginning with W. W Windle Co. v. Commissioner,8 the Tax Court
exhibited a preference for this new method of motivation analysis. In
Windle, the taxpayer, a wool processor, purchased a controlling block of
stock in a woolen mill to ensure itself a "captive customer."39 Studies
had predicted that the new company, Nor-West, would be profitable and
that Windle would profit from sales it made to Nor-West.4° Nor-West,
however, suffered severe financial losses and liquidated.41  Windle
claimed an ordinary loss deduction for its Nor-West stock on the ground
that it purchased and held the stock solely for business purposes.4 2
The Tax Court found that although Windle had a principal business
motive, the acquisition of a captive customer, it also had a substantial
investment motive, the expectation of profit.43 The court held that the
existence of a substantial investment motive precluded the application of
originally invested about $40,000 in the company. 405 U.S. at 93. The taxpayer also was the presi-
dent, receiving an annual salary of S12,000. To help the company's poor financial situation, Generes
lent it over $300,000. mL at 98-99. When the company went bankrupt, Generes claimed the loans
were nonbusiness bad debts and deducted them against ordinary income. Id. at 99.
The Court employed the business motive/investment motive test because of the ease of its applica-
tion. The Court stated:
The dominant motivation standard has the attribute of workability. It provides a guideline
of certainty for the trier of fact. . . . By making the dominant motivation the measure, the
logical tax consequence ensues and prevents the mere presence of a business motive, how-
ever small and however insignificant, from controlling the tax result at the taxpayer's
convenience.
ld, at 104.
37. Id
38. 65 T.C. 694 (1976), appeal dismissed, 550 F.2d 43 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 966
(1977).
The first court to adopt the substantial investment motive test was the Court of Claims in Dear-
born Co. v. United States, 444 F.2d 1145 (Ct. Cl. 1971).
39. 65 T.C. at 704-05.
40. Id. at 705.
41. Id. at 702.
42. Id. at 703.
43. Id. at 706.
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the Corn Products doctrine, requiring capital asset treatment.44
The Windle court noted several reasons for its adoption of the substan-
tial investment motive test. First, the court feared that an expansive defi-
nition of capital assets would increase subjective analysis and
unpredictability.45 Second, the substantial investment motive test would
decrease taxpayer opportunity to whipsaw the government.46 Finally, the
court stated that a more restrictive analysis of the Corn Products doctrine
would better effectuate Congress' classification of ordinary and capital
assets.47
Courts have examined three primary factors to determine whether a
substantial investment motive exists. 48 First, courts have considered the
length of time that a purchaser intends to hold an asset and the time that
he actually does hold it. A person who purchases an asset for a short-
term business need and holds it after that need has expired is presumed
to act with an investment motive.49 Second, a taxpayer's payment of a
premium above an asset's fair market value may indicate the absence of
an investment motive." Finally, the acquisition of an asset with the ex-
pectation of profits may indicate an investment motive.51
44. Id. at 712.
45. Id. at 713. The court expressed concern that if the exceptions to capital assets were ex-
panded, taxpayers and courts would be uncertain of the proper treatment to accord specific assets.
46. Mda The court believed that if it lessened the degree of investment motive required to pre-
clude Corn Products treatment, the resulting decrease in taxpayer flexibility would decrease taxpayer
opportunity to whipsaw the government.
The term "whipsaw" describes a situation in which a taxpayer categorizes a gain or loss as either
capital or ordinary solely to provide the most favorable tax consequence.
47. According to the court, "in the last analysis, Congress has decided what is a capital asset,
and there must be limits to the liberties we can take with the statutory language of section 1221." Id.
48. See, eg., Dearborn Co. v. United States, 444 F.2d 1145 (Ct. Cl. 1971); W.W. Windle Co. v.
Commissioner, 65 T.C. 694 (1976), appeal dismissed, 550 F.2d 43 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S.
966 (1977).
49. See, eg., Dearborn Co. v. United States, 444 F.2d 1145, 1166 (Ct. Cl. 1971) (investment
motive found when stock purchased for permanent business need was sold before need expired);
Crow v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 541, 563 (1982); W.W. Windle Co. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 694,
712 (1976) (investment motive found when stock purchased for permanent business need is disposed
of before the business need expired), appeal dismissed, 550 F.2d 43 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S.
966 (1977).
50. See, eg., Dearborn Co. v. United States, 444 F.2d 1145, 1167 (Ct. Cl. 1971) (nonpayment of
premimum implied investment intent); FS Servs., Inc. v. United States, 413 F.2d 548, 554 (Ct. Cl.
1969) (payment of a premium implied business intent); Booth Newspapers, Inc. v. United States, 303
F.2d 916, 917 (Ct. Cl. 1969) (payment of a premium implied business motive); W.W. Windle Co. v.
Commissioner, 65 T.C. 694, 712 (1976) (nonpayment of a premium implies investment motive),
appeal dismissed, 550 F.2d 43 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 966 (1977).
51. See, eg., Dearborn Co. v. United States, 444 F.2d 1145, 1166-67 (Ct. Cl. 1971) (expectation
[Vol. 64:217
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C. Post Windle Treatment of the Corn Products Doctrine-A
Narrowing in Scope
Although federal district and appellate courts have generally relied on
the business motive/investment motive test,52 the Tax Court has consist-
ently applied the substantial investment motive test when faced with a
Corn Products issue. 3 In addition, the Tax Court has narrowed the
scope of the doctrine. For example, in Pollack v. Commissioner,54 de-
cided one year after Windle, the Tax Court limited application of the
doctrine with respect to partnership interests. In Pollack, the taxpayer, a
management consultant, bought an interest in a limited partnership ven-
ture that acquired and rehabilitated failing businesses. Once acquired,
these failing businesses engaged the services of the limited partners. 6
Although Pollack expected to profit from this work referral system,57 the
venture failed and Pollack sold his interest at a loss.5 8
Relying on the Corn Products rationale, Pollack sought an ordinary
loss deduction, claiming that business interests alone motivated the
transaction.59 The Tax Court denied Corn Products treatment and stated
that the doctrine applied only to transactions arising under Code sections
that refer to the capital asset definition in section 1221.60 Because the
Code section governing the transfer of partnership interests did not refer
to section 1221, the court reasoned that Corn Products treatment was
unavailable.6
of profits implied investment motive); Arkansas Best Corp. v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 640, 654
(1984) (expectation of asset appreciation implied investment motive); Bell Fibre Prods. Corp. v.
Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 182 (1977) (expectation of profits implied investment motive);
W.W. Windle Co. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 694, 705 (1976) (expectations of profits "make it impos-
sible for us to find that there was no substantial investment motive"), appeal dismissed, 550 F.2d 43
(1st Cir.), cert denied, 431 U.S. 966 (1977).
52. See, eg., Campbell Taggart, Inc. v. United States, 744 F.2d 442, 457 (5th Cir. 1984) (tax-
payer with predominant business motive allowed an ordinary loss deduction on sale of stock).
53. See, e.g., Arkansas Best Corp. v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 640 (1984); Mariani Frozen Food,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 448 (1983).
54. 69 T.C. 142 (1977).
55. Id. at 143-44.
56. Id at 143.
57. Id
58. Id. at 144.
59. Id at 145.
60. Id. at 147 n.7.
61. Id at 147. Section 741 of the Code provides that when a taxpayer transfers a partnership
interest, any gain or loss from such transfer shall be treated as "gain or loss from the sale or ex-
change of a capital asset." I.R.C. § 741 (1982). Although the Pollack court correctly noted that
§ 741 did not refer to § 1221, the court ignored the fact that the term "capital asset" appeared in
Washington University Open Scholarship
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The Tax Court has also narrowed the scope of the Corn Products doc-
trine by placing a strict burden of proof on the taxpayer. To prevail in
the Tax Court, the taxpayer must not only prove the presence of a busi-
ness motive, but also disprove the existence of a substantial investment
motive.62
Two aspects of this burden of proof have removed Corn Products treat-
ment from the reach of most taxpayers. First, the Tax Court has set a
low threshold for finding a substantial investment motive. Thus, the
existence of profit forecasts and projections, for example, may be suffi-
cient to indicate a substantial investment motive.63 Second, the Tax
Court has strictly applied its motive analysis to cases involving changed
motives. Prior to Windle,64 the taxpayer's motive at the time of the sale
of the asset controlled for tax purposes.65  After Windle, however, if a
taxpayer's motive changed after purchase of the asset, he could no longer
disprove a substantial investment motive.66 Because he held the asset
with an investment purpose for a period of time, he presumably pos-
sessed a substantial investment motive.
III. UNSUCCESSFUL EFFORTS AT REFORM
Congress intended to deny capital gains treatment to property used as
a normal source of business income .6  The Corn Products doctrine fur-
thers this policy by providing ordinary income treatment to profits and
§ 741 and that this term must have been defined somewhere in the Code. The logical source was
§ 1221. Thus, the court's rationale for denying Corn Products treatment did not justify the result.
For a general discussion of the Pollack decision and the Corn Products doctrine, see Note, The
Corn Products Doctrine and Its Application to Partnership Interests, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 341 (1979);
Note, Section 741 and Corn Products A Logical Extension?, 31 U. FLA. L. REv. 90 (1978).
62. See, eg., Wright v. Commissioner, 47 T.C.M. (CCII) 422, 427 (1983) ("petitioners have the
burden of proving the absence of a substantial investment motive in petitioner's purchase and reten-
tion of the stock"); Hollingsworth v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 580, 585 (1979) ("petitioners have the
burden of proof to negate a substantial investment motive [in] purchasing and holding the note").
63. See supra note 51.
64. See supra notes 38-47 and accompanying text.
65. See, eg., Chemplast, Inc. v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 623, 632 n.9 (1973); Missisquoi Corp. v.
Commissioner, 37 T.C. 791, 797-98 (1962); Gulftex Drug Co. v. Commissioner, 29 T.C. 118, 121
(1957).
66. See, eg., Arkansas Best Corp. v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 640, 653 (1984) ("When a tax-
payer's motive changes between the time of purchase and the time of disposition. . . the character
of the gain or loss at disposition of the stock will be capital."); Hollingsworth v. Commissioner, 71
T.C. 580, 587 n.3 (1979) ("a subsequent abandonment of petitioner's substantial investment motive
in purchasing the note will not alter [the finding of capital loss treatment]").
67. See supra note 22 and text accompanying note 23.
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losses arising from everyday business activities.68 The Tax Court's nar-
row construction of the Corn Products doctrine, however, ignores con-
gressional intent.
The Tax Court's reliance on motive analysis raises additional con-
cerns. Any motive test is difficult to apply. Inherent in such tests are
ambiguities that often point to several possible motives.6 9 Ambiguities
lead to taxpayer uncertainty and increase the potential for taxpayer ma-
nipulation. Because of lack of predictability, motive tests encourage the
use of "formalisms and artificial distinctions."70 Consequently, courts
may reach incorrect conclusions.
The problems discussed above suggest the need for reform. Effective
reform would require a method of analysis that would avoid the inherent
difficulties of motive analysis, minimize the potential for taxpayer manip-
ulation, and accommodate Congress' intent to limit preferential tax
treatment. Several suggested reforms have included provisions that
would provide the taxpayer with a free election to choose the tax status
of all Corn Products assets, either capital or noncapital. The taxpayer
would then be held to that choice when taxes were due.7
Congress considered a version of free election but ultimately rejected
it.72 Under the bill, if the taxpayer elected noncapital treatment on prop-
erty and realized a gain, the tax treatment would automatically be ordi-
nary. If the taxpayer realized a loss, however, the government could
deny the taxpayer ordinary treatment.73 Thus, the major defect in the
bill was that it clearly favored the government.
A commentator has suggested a freer election system that would im-
prove upon the failed House bill. This proposal would allow the tax-
payer to elect the tax treatment of certain assets upon their acquisition.74
If the taxpayer, within thirty days after acquisition, filed notice with the
Secretary of the Treasury that the asset was not an investment, then gain
or loss upon disposition would receive ordinary treatment. If the tax-
payer did not file notice, however, gain or loss from disposition would
receive capital treatment.
68. See Corn Products, 350 U.S. at 52.
69. See Note, The Unpleasant Taste of Corn Products, 53 S. CAL. L. REv. 311, 332-34 (1979).
70. Woodward v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 572, 577 (1970).
71. See Note, supra note 69, at 344-54.
72. H.R. 10902, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 94-1360, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
6-7 (1976).
73. See Note, supra note 69, at 353.
74. See id. at 346-47.
Number 1]
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The major advantage of this proposal is that it would limit the tax-
payer's ability to whipsaw the government upon disposal of an asset.75
This proposal, however, would also present several disadvantages. First,
although the proposal would prevent taxpayer manipulation at the end of
an asset's holding period, the taxpayer could still engage in manipulation
at the time of the election. Regardless of investment or business motives,
a taxpayer could determine an asset's ultimate tax treatment based upon
a preliminary assessment of whether a gain or loss would result upon
disposition. Second, free election would frustrate congressional intent to
give ordinary asset treatment to an asset acquired solely for everyday
business activities. The taxpayer, by failing to file with the Secretary,
would receive capital asset treatment when Congress clearly intended
otherwise. In the case of a gain, the taxpayer would receive an unde-
served windfall.
IV. A NEW PROPOSAL-THE BUSINESS RISK TEST
This Note proposes that courts should allow Corn Products treatment
if the taxpayer establishes a reasonable likelihood that an acquired asset
would reduce a substantial business risk. The taxpayer would bear the
burden of making this showing.76 First, the taxpayer would be required
to establish the existence of a substantial business risk. Second, the tax-
payer would be required to prove that the acquired asset would be rea-
sonably likely to reduce that risk. In the case of a gain, the taxpayer
could refute the government's attempt to apply the Corn Products doc-
trine by proving the absence of a reasonable likelihood that the asset
would reduce a substantial business risk.7 7
The requirement that the taxpayer establish a substantial business
risk78 would ensure that courts would not grant ordinary income treat-
75. Because the taxpayer would be required to choose the tax treatment at the time of acquisi-
tion, he could not wait to determine whether a gain or loss would be realized and then elect the more
favorable treatment.
76. The taxpayer would be required to make this showing only if the asset did not fall within
one of the enumerated capital asset exceptions listed in § 1221.
77. The taxpayer could refute a government claim of Corn Products treatment by showing that
the business risk test was not met. He could do this by establishing: (1) the lack of a business;
(2) the lack of a substantial business risk; or (3) that the asset would not be reasonably likely to
reduce the substantial business risk.
78. To minimize taxpayer manipulation, the factfinder's determination of the existence of a
substantial business risk should be objective.
[Vol. 64:217
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ment for an asset purchased to reduce some nominal business risk.79 For
example, courts should deny Corn Products treatment to losses resulting
from the taxpayer's sale of stock in a business that supplies an insignifi-
cant quantity of material to the taxpayer if a dependable and abundant
supply were available from other sources." The significance of the risk
must be such that a reasonable taxpayer would attempt to reduce it.
The second element of the business risk test would require the tax-
payer to establish a reasonable likelihood that the acquired asset would
reduce the defined business risk.' The factfinder would employ an ob-
jective analysis to determine whether the taxpayer met his burden. The
factfinder would determine the reasonableness of a transaction at the
time the taxpayer entered into it. Thus, the fact that an asset ultimately
failed to reduce the business risk would not preclude Corn Products
treatment of the transaction. 2
To determine whether a transaction would be reasonably likely to re-
duce a substantial business risk, the factfinder should analyze the follow-
ing two factors. First, the factfinder should examine the relationship
between the asset and the risk. The strength of this relationship could be
determined by examining the nature of the asset and its suitability for
reducing a risk in the taxpayer's business. This nexus should be suffi-
ciently strong.83 Second, the factfinder should compare the degree of the
business risk to the value of the acquired assets. The amount of the as-
sets purchased should be reasonably related to the substantiality of the
business risk. This examination would differ from the examination of the
relationship between the risk and the asset because this analysis would
compare the quantum of the assets purchased with the quantum of the
business risk. 4
79. A requirement of substantiality would prevent a taxpayer from manipulating tax treatment
because of an insignificant business risk.
80. Conversely, ordinary loss treatment would be appropriate for a taxpayer who suffered a loss
upon the sale of stock in a company that supplied all or most of a certain product to the taxpayer.
81. This requirement insures that the purchase of the asset would be causally connected to the
business risk.
82. A taxpayer should not be deprived of Corn Products treatment just because his assessment
of the risk-reducing capability of an asset proved to be incorrect.
83. For example, if the taxpayer were a clothing manufacturer who purchased and sold stock in
a furniture company, the nexus between the purchased asset and any taxpayer business risk would be
took weak to allow Corn Products treatment. However, if a clothing manufacturer purchased and
sold stock in a clothing retailer or a cotton mill, the nexus between the asset and the risk would
probably warrant Corn Products treatment.
84. For example, if a taxpayer who grew and marketed fruits and vegetables bought only three
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The business risk test would avoid the difficulties inherent in motive
tests.8 5 The factfinder's determination would be based on objective evi-
dence without regard to subjective motives. The business risk test also
would minimize taxpayer manipulation without unduly restricting the
Corn Products doctrine's availability.86 Because taxpayers would be un-
able to easily manipulate factual circumstances, taxpayers would be less
likely to whipsaw the government. Finally, the business risk test would
further congressional intent by denying preferential tax treatment to
property used as a normal source of business income.8 7 Because the busi-
ness risk test would focus on the asset's relationship to the business, Corn
Products treatment would be available only to those assets that fell
within the scope of the capital assets exception that Congress intended to
create.
V. CONCLUSION
By adopting the business risk test, courts could restore the Corn Prod-
ucts doctrine to its intended status. Congress recognized the need for
some reform but unfortunately failed to provide a solution. The business
risk test would further congressional intent, avoid the problems inherent
in current motive analysis, and frustrate potential taxpayer manipulation.
Michael E. Mermall
percent of the stock in a retail food outlet, courts could preclude Corn Products treatment. Argua-
bly, there would be no reasonable likelihood that the relatively small purchase of stock would reduce
the substantial business risk of marketing the taxpayer's produce. On the other hand, courts could
apply Corn Products treatment to the purchase of a controlling interest in such a retail food outlet
because there would be a reasonable likelihood that a controlling interest would reduce the business
risk.
85. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
86. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
87. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
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